[ 劉成偉 ]——(2003-7-7) / 已閱76414次
All this leads the Panel to consider that, in practice, even if in a particular case a mutually satisfactory adjustment may be made under Article XXIII:1(b), in general, the risk of an effective increase in the cost of measures necessary to protect public health because of the applicability of Article XXIII:1(b) to measures justified under Article XX can only be very marginal. In fact, considering the criteria mentioned in the previous paragraph, very few measures of this kind could give rise to the application of Article XXIII:1(b).
For these reasons we do not subscribe to the interpretation proposed by the European Communities. Accordingly, we will continue our examination of the measure in the light of Article XIII:1(b) of the GATT 1994.”
The European Communities contends that the Panel erred in finding that Art. XXIII:1(b) applied to measures pursuing health objectives, rather than commercial ones, and which could, therefore, be justified under Art. XX(b) of the GATT 1994. In this respect, the Appellate Body finds that:10
“The European Communities also contends that the Panel erred in finding that Article XXIII:1(b) applies to measures which pursue health, rather than commercial, objectives and which can, therefore, be justified under Article XX(b) of the GATT 1994. Once again, we look to the text of Article XXIII:1(b), which provides that ‘the application by another Member of any measure’ may give rise to a cause of action under that provision. The use of the word ‘a(chǎn)ny’ suggests that measures of all types may give rise to such a cause of action. The text does not distinguish between, or exclude, certain types of measure. Clearly, therefore, the text of Article XXIII:1(b) contradicts the European Communities' argument that certain types of measure, namely, those with health objectives, are excluded from the scope of application of Article XXIII:1(b).
In any event, an attempt to draw the distinction suggested by the European Communities between so-called health and commercial measures would be very difficult in practice. By definition, measures which affect trade in goods, and which are subject to the disciplines of the GATT 1994, have a commercial impact. At the same time, the health objectives of many measures may be attainable only by means of commercial regulation. Thus, in practice, clear distinctions between health and commercial measures may be very difficult to establish. Nor do we see merit in the argument that, previously, only ‘commercial’ measures have been the subject of Article XXIII:1(b) claims, as that does not establish that a claim cannot be made under Article XXIII:1(b) regarding a ‘non-commercial’ measure.
An important aspect of the European Communities' argument is that a Member cannot have reasonable expectations of continued market access for products which are shown to pose a serious risk to human life or health. However, the paragraphs of the Panel Report appealed by the European Communities involve exclusively the Panel's findings on the threshold issues of the scope of application of Article XXIII:1(b). This particular argument of the European Communities, important as it is, simply does not relate to those threshold issues. Rather, the European Communities' argument relates to the substance of a claim that has been determined to fall within the scope of application of Article XXIII:1(b) and, in particular, concerns the issue whether a ‘benefit’ has been ‘nullified or impaired’ by a measure restricting market access for products posing a health risk. Here, we emphasize that the European Communities does not appeal the Panel's findings relating to the ‘nullification or impairment’ of a ‘benefit’ through the frustration of reasonable expectations by application of the measure at issue. We do not, therefore, find it necessary to examine the European Communities' argument relating to reasonable expectations.
For these reasons, we dismiss the European Communities' appeal under Article XXIII:1(b) of the GATT 1994 and uphold the Panel's finding that Article XXIII:1(b) applies to measures which fall within the scope of application of other provisions of the GATT 1994 and which pursue health objectives. ”
（iv）Measures Applied Continuingly
Given that the text of Art. XXIII:1(b) contemplates nullification or impairment in the present tense, caused by application of a measure, “whether or not it conflicts” (also in the present tense), the ordinary meaning of this provision limits the non-violation remedy to measures that are currently being applied. In only a very small number of cases, involving very particular situations, have panels proceeded to adjudicate claims involving measures which no longer exist or which are not being applied any longer. In those cases, the measures have been typically applied in the very recent past. For example, in Japan-Film (DS44), the parties disagree as to whether or not certain of the “measures” at issue are still in effect. In this respect, the Panel rules that:11
“[…] Given the significance of the principle of continued application of measures to the interpretation of Article XXIII:1(b), we shall need to give particularly careful analysis -- in examining the individual ‘measures’--to the evidence relating to such alleged continuing administrative guidance. At this stage, suffice it to say that we do not rule out the possibility that old ‘measures’ that were never officially revoked may continue to be applied through continuing administrative guidance. Similarly, even if measures were officially revoked, the underlying policies may continue to be applied through continuing administrative guidance. However, the burden is on the United States to demonstrate clearly that such guidance does in fact exist and that it is currently nullifying or impairing benefits.”
III Existence of a Benefit: Protection of Legitimate Expectations
（i）Protection of Legitimate Expectations（PLE）
As discussed previously, it is ruled that the non-violation remedy has an important role - that of protecting the reasonable expectations of competitive opportunities through negotiated concessions.
In this regard, the Panel in Japan - Film（DS44）rules that: “The second required element which must be considered to establish a case of non-violation nullification or impairment under Article XXIII:1(b) is the existence of a benefit accruing to a WTO Member under the relevant agreement (in this case, GATT 1994). In all but one of the past GATT cases dealing with Article XXIII:1(b) claims, the claimed benefit has been that of legitimate expectations of improved market-access opportunities arising out of relevant tariff concessions. This same set of GATT precedents suggests that for expectations to be legitimate, they must take into account all measures of the party making the concession that could have been reasonably anticipated at the time of the concession. Of course, as with the first element (application of a measure), the complaining party has the burden of demonstrating the ‘benefit accruing’.”12 And the Panel goes on to analyze:13
“The text of Article XXIII:1(b) simply refers to ‘a(chǎn) benefit accruing, directly or indirectly, under this Agreement’ and does not further define or explain what benefits are referred to. Past GATT panel reports have considered that such benefits include those that a Member reasonably expects to obtain from a tariff negotiation.
The first GATT report analysing Article XXIII:1(b) was the 1950 Report of the Working Party on Australian Subsidy on Ammonium Sulphate. The Working Party found that the withdrawal by Australia of a wartime subsidy on sodium nitrate fertilizer while maintaining a subsidy on ammonium sulphate fertilizer, although not inconsistent with Australia's GATT obligations, nullified or impaired benefits accruing to Chile under the General Agreement. The Working Party agreed that impairment would exist if the Australian action ‘which resulted in upsetting the competitive relationship between sodium nitrate and ammonium sulphate could not reasonably have been anticipated by the Chilean Government, taking into consideration all pertinent circumstances and the provisions of the General Agreement, at the time it negotiated for the duty-free binding on sodium nitrate. The working party concluded that the Government of Chile had reason to assume, during these negotiations, that the war-time fertilizer subsidy would not be removed from sodium nitrate before it was removed from ammonium sulphate. [Reasons omitted.] For these reasons, the working party also concluded that the Australian action should be considered as relating to a benefit accruing to Chile under the Agreement, and that it was therefore subject to the provisions of Article XXIII. ... The inequality created and the treatment Chile could have expected at the time of the negotiation, after taking into consideration all pertinent circumstances, including the circumstances mentioned above, and the provisions of the General Agreement, were important elements in the working party's conclusions’.
The 1952 Panel Report on Germany - Sardines also based a non-violation finding on an ‘a(chǎn)ction of the German Government, which resulted in upsetting the competitive relationship between [different members of the same fish family that] could not reasonably have been anticipated by the Norwegian Government at the time it negotiated for tariff reductions on [fish]’. In so finding, the panel noted that Norway ‘had reason to assume’ that the fish they were interested in would not be treated less favourably.
Two GATT study groups elaborated these concepts in the context of subsidies, in each case focusing on whether a party had reasonable expectations that certain treatment would continue. In 1955, a working party wrote:
‘So far as domestic subsidies are concerned, it was agreed that a contracting party which has negotiated a concession under Article II may be assumed, for the purpose of Article XXIII, to have a reasonable expectation, failing evidence to the contrary, that the value of the concession will not be nullified or impaired by the contracting party which granted the concession by the subsequent introduction or increase of a domestic subsidy on the product concerned’.
A 1961 report, citing the foregoing paragraph, stated:
‘In this connexion it was noted that the expression 'reasonable expectation' was qualified by the words 'failing evidence to the contrary'. By this the Panel understands that the presumption is that unless such pertinent facts were available at the time the tariff concession was negotiated, it was then reasonably to be expected that the concession would not be nullified or impaired by the introduction or increase of a domestic subsidy.’
The 1990 Panel Report on EEC - Oilseeds approached a non-violation complaint as follows:
‘The Panel examined whether it was reasonable for the United States to expect that the Community would not introduce subsidy schemes systematically counteracting the price effect of the tariff concessions.
. . .
The Panel does not share the view of the Community that the recognition of the legitimacy of such expectations would amount to a re-writing of the rules of the General Agreement. The contracting parties have decided that a finding of impairment does not authorize them to request the impairing contracting party to remove a measure not inconsistent with the General Agreement; such a finding merely allows the contracting party frustrated in its expectation to request, in accordance with Article XXIII:2, an authorization to suspend the application of concessions or other obligations under the General Agreement. The recognition of the legitimacy of an expectation thus essentially means the recognition of the legitimacy of such a request. The recognition of the legitimacy of an expectation relating to the use of production subsidies therefore in no way prevents a contracting party from using production subsidies consistently with the General Agreement; it merely delineates the scope of the protection of a negotiated balance of concessions. For these reasons the Panel found that the United States may be assumed not to have anticipated the introduction of subsidies which protect Community producers of oilseeds completely from the movement of prices for imports and thereby prevent tariff concessions from having any impact on the competitive relationship between domestic and imported oilseeds, and which have as one consequence that all domestically-produced oilseeds are disposed of in the internal market notwithstanding the availability of imports’.
As suggested by the 1961 report, in order for expectations of a benefit to be legitimate, the challenged measures must not have been reasonably anticipated at the time the tariff concession was negotiated. If the measures were anticipated, a Member could not have had a legitimate expectation of improved market access to the extent of the impairment caused by these measures.
Thus, under Article XXIII:1(b), the United States may only claim impairment of benefits related to improved market access conditions flowing from relevant tariff concessions by Japan to the extent that the United States could not have reasonably anticipated that such benefits would be offset by the subsequent application of a measure by the Government of Japan. In the case before us, there is disagreement between the parties on this issue of reasonable anticipation with respect to each and every ‘measure’ claimed by the United States to nullify and impair benefits accruing to it under GATT.”
（ii）Non-foreseeability of Measures at Issue
As noted above, for expectations to be legitimate, all measures of the party making the concession that could have been reasonably anticipated at the time of the concession must be taken into account. Of course, as with the first element (application of a measure), the complaining party has the burden of demonstrating the “benefit accruing”. In the context, there would be certain logic in making a distinction between the concept of legitimate expectation of a benefit and that of the reasonable foreseeability of a measure. In particular, the need to prove that a complained-of measure was objectively non-foreseeable at the time of negotiations leads to an implicit recognition of legitimacy of the expectations as crucial to the decision of whether or not the state can claim nullification or impairment.
As noted previously, a WTO member may be assumed, for the purpose of Art. XXIII, to have a reasonable expectation, failing evidence to the contrary, that the value of the concession will not be nullified or impaired by the member which granted the concession by the subsequent introduction or increase of a domestic measure. And in this connexion it is noted that the expression “reasonable expectation” is qualified by the words “failing evidence to the contrary”. By this it suggests that the presumption is that unless such pertinent facts were available at the time the concession was negotiated, it is then reasonably to be expected that the concession would not be nullified or impaired by the introduction or increase of a domestic measure. I.e., the complainant could not have reasonably anticipated that its benefits would be offset by the subsequent application of a measure by the complained-of Government. As suggested, in order for expectations of a benefit to be legitimate, the challenged measures must not have been reasonably anticipated at the time the concession was negotiated. If the measures were anticipated, a Member could not have had a legitimate expectation of improved market access to the extent of the impairment caused by these measures. However, what factors should be considered to determine whether a Member should have reasonably anticipated measures that it claims nullified or impaired benefits? In this regard, the Panel in Japan-Film（DS44）rules in relevant part:14
“An obvious starting point for determining whether a measure was reasonably anticipated is to consider whether the measure was adopted before or after the conclusion of the relevant round of tariff negotiations, which is the approach taken in the 1961 report quoted above. The parties argue, however, that the matter is much more complicated than that. According to the United States, it was simply unaware of some ‘measures’ that predated the conclusion of the relevant round of tariff negotiations due to their nontransparent nature. In other instances, the United States indicates that although it was aware of the existence of the ‘measures’ prior to such conclusion, it did not know and could not have known of their significance in relation to access of imported film and paper to the Japanese market at the time of the relevant tariff negotiations. Japan, in contrast, maintains that the United States did anticipate or should have anticipated all of the alleged ‘measures’. In this regard, it argues that exporting Members should reasonably anticipate GATT-consistent measures taken by an importing Member to improve the efficiency of a particular sector of its economy, such as the distribution sector.
We consider that the issue of reasonable anticipation should be approached in respect of specific ‘measures’ in light of the following guidelines. First, in the case of measures shown by the United States to have been introduced subsequent to the conclusion of the tariff negotiations at issue, it is our view that the United States has raised a presumption that it should not be held to have anticipated these measures and it is then for Japan to rebut that presumption. Such a rebuttal might be made, for example, by establishing that the measure at issue is so clearly contemplated in an earlier measure that the United States should be held to have anticipated it. However, there must be a clear connection shown. In our view, it is not sufficient to claim that a specific measure should have been anticipated because it is consistent with or a continuation of a past general government policy. As in the EEC - Oilseeds case, we do not believe that it would be appropriate to charge the United States with having reasonably anticipated all GATT-consistent measures, such as ‘measures’ to improve what Japan describes as the inefficient Japanese distribution sector. Indeed, if a Member were held to anticipate all GATT-consistent measures, a non-violation claim would not be possible. Nor do we consider that as a general rule the United States should have reasonably anticipated Japanese measures that are similar to measures in other Members' markets. In each such instance, the issue of reasonable anticipation needs to be addressed on a case-by-case basis.
Second, in the case of measures shown by Japan to have been introduced prior to the conclusion of the tariff negotiations at issue, it is our view that Japan has raised a presumption that the United States should be held to have anticipated those measures and it is for the United States to rebut that presumption. In this connection, it is our view that the United States is charged with knowledge of Japanese government measures as of the date of their publication. We realize that knowledge of a measure's existence is not equivalent to understanding the impact of the measure on a specific product market. For example, a vague measure could be given substance through enforcement policies that are initially unexpected or later changed significantly. However, where the United States claims that it did not know of a measure's relevance to market access conditions in respect of film or paper, we would expect the United States to clearly demonstrate why initially it could not have reasonably anticipated the effect of an existing measure on the film or paper market and when it did realize the effect. Such a showing will need to be tied to the relevant points in time (i.e., the conclusions of the Kennedy, Tokyo and Uruguay Rounds) in order to assess the extent of the United States' legitimate expectations of benefits from these three Rounds. A simple statement that a Member's measures were so opaque and informal that their impact could not be assessed is not sufficient. While it is true that in most past non-violation cases, one could easily discern a clear link between a product-specific action and the effect on the tariff concession that it allegedly impaired, one can also discern a link between general measures affecting the internal sale and distribution of products, such as rules on advertising and premiums, and tariff concessions on products in general.”
（iii）Benefits in the Negotiations
As noted previously, “these observations [concerning non-violation cases] by previous panels are entirely in line with the concept of pacta sunt servanda”. However, one of the issues that arises in Korea-Government Procurement (DS163) is whether the concept of non-violation can arise in contexts other than the traditional approach represented by pacta sunt servanda. Can, for instance the question of error in treaty negotiation be addressed under Article 26 of the DSU and Article XXII:2 of the GPA? In this respect, the Panel rules that they see no reason why it could not. The Panel found that parties to a treaty had an obligation to negotiate in good faith just as they must implement the treaty in good faith. And they ruled in relevant part as follows:15
“Thus, on the basis of the ample evidence provided by both parties to the dispute, we will review the claim of nullification or impairment raised by the United States within the framework of principles of international law which are generally applicable not only to performance of treaties but also to treaty negotiation. To do otherwise potentially would leave a gap in the applicability of the law generally to WTO disputes and we see no evidence in the language of the WTO Agreements that such a gap was intended. If the non-violation remedy were deemed not to provide a relief for such problems as have arisen in the present case regarding good faith and error in the negotiation of GPA commitments (and one might add, in tariff and services commitments under other WTO Agreements), then nothing could be done about them within the framework of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism if general rules of customary international law on good faith and error in treaty negotiations were ruled not to be applicable. As was argued above, that would not be in conformity with the normal relationship between international law and treaty law or with the WTO Agreements.
If non-violation represents an extension of the good faith requirements in the implementation of a treaty and can also be applied to good faith and error in negotiations under the GPA, and we think it can, then the special remedies for non-violation contained in DSU Article 26 should also be applied rather than the traditional remedies of treaty law which are not apposite to the situation of the GPA.”
(iv) Benefits under Successive Rounds
In Japan-Film, the question of legitimate expectations of benefits accruing to the United States is complicated by the fact that the United States was claiming to have expectations of improved market access benefits in respect of four different products (each under a different tariff line), granted during three successive rounds of multilateral trade negotiations. The United States claims to have reasonable expectations of benefits accruing to it under Art. XXIII:1(b) as the result of tariff concessions granted by Japan on black and white film and paper during the Kennedy Round (1967), on colour and black and white film and paper during the Tokyo Round (1979) and on colour and black and white film and paper during the Uruguay Round (1994). Japan argues that the reasonable expectations of the United States must be limited to those existing in 1994 at the conclusion of the Uruguay Round in that these latter expectations reflected a new balance and global reassessment of the value of market access concessions, replacing any reasonable expectations that might have arisen under prior tariff negotiations.
One of the general issues raised by the particular case of Japan-Film (DS44) is that, may the benefits legitimately expected by a Member derive from successive rounds of tariff negotiations? In this respect, the Panel rules as follows: 16
“Two provisions of GATT 1994 (sub-paragraphs (b)(i) and (d) of paragraph 1) appear to us to be relevant to the resolution of this matter. The text of GATT 1994 provides in relevant part: […]
As referenced in the quoted text -- also known as the GATT 1994 incorporation clause -- GATT 1994 incorporates both ‘protocols and certifications relating to tariff concessions’ under paragraph 1(b)(i) and ‘the Marrakesh Protocol to GATT 1994’ under paragraph 1(d). The ordinary meaning of the text of paragraphs 1(b)(i) and 1(d) of GATT 1994, read together, clearly suggests that all protocols relating to tariff concessions, both those predating the Uruguay Round and the Marrakesh Protocol to GATT 1994, are incorporated into GATT 1994 and continue to have legal existence under the WTO Agreement.
Japan appears to argue that the Schedules annexed to the Marrakesh Protocol prevail as a later agreement over Schedules that entered into force under GATT 1947. In our view, such an interpretation would only make sense if the Marrakesh Protocol, referred to in paragraph 1(d) of GATT 1994, were viewed as later in time than the protocols referred to in paragraph 1(b)(i) thereof, and then, only to the extent of any conflict between tariff concessions annexed to the Marrakesh Protocol and the concessions in the other tariff protocols incorporated in GATT 1994. We consider that, as argued by the United States, Article 30 of the Vienna Convention, which is designed to resolve conflicts between provisions of successive treaties on the same subject matter, is not applicable to the situation at hand because there is nothing inherently incompatible -- in conflict -- between the earlier and later agreed tariff concessions. Such a conflict would only seem to exist if the subsequent concessions were less favourable than prior concessions, which is not the situation in this case. Where tariff concessions have been progressively improved, the benefits -- expectations of improved market access -- accruing directly or indirectly under different tariff concession protocols incorporated in GATT 1994 can be read in harmony. This approach is in accordance with general principles of legal interpretation which, as the Appellate Body reiterated in US - Gasoline, teach that one should endeavour to give legal effect to all elements of a treaty and not reduce them to redundancy or inutility.
The conclusion that benefits accruing from concessions granted during successive rounds of tariff negotiations may separately give rise to reasonable expectations of improved market access is consistent with past panel reports. The panel in EEC - Canned Fruit found that the United States had a reasonable expectation arising from the EEC's 1974 tariff concessions pursuant to Article XXIV:6 negotiations and 1979 Tokyo Round tariff concessions (even though the panel separately found that the United States could have anticipated certain subsidies in respect of the Tokyo Round tariff concessions). And the EEC - Oilseeds panel found that the United States had a reasonable expectation arising from the EEC's 1962 Dillon Round tariff concessions. As the United States points out, these findings would not have been possible if subsequent multilateral tariff agreements or enlargement agreements were deemed to extinguish wholesale the tariff concessions in prior tariff schedules.
The following quotation from the EEC - Oilseeds panel report appears to us to be particularly on point:
‘In these circumstances, the partners of the Community in the successive renegotiations under Article XXIV:6 could legitimately assume, in the absence of any indications to the contrary, that the offer to continue a tariff commitment by the Community was an offer not to change the balance of concessions previously attained. The Panel noted that nothing in the material submitted to it indicated that the Community had made it clear to its negotiating partners that the withdrawal and reinstitution of the tariff concessions for oilseeds as part of the withdrawal of the whole of the Community Schedule meant that the Community was seeking a new balance of concessions with respect to these items. There is in particular no evidence that the Community, in the context of these negotiations, offered to compensate its negotiating partners for any impairment of the tariff concessions through production subsidies or that it accepted compensatory tariff withdrawals by its negotiating partners to take into account any such impairment. The balance of concessions negotiated in 1962 in respect of oilseeds was thus not altered in the successive Article XXIV:6 negotiations. The Panel therefore found that the benefits accruing to the United States under the oilseed tariff concessions resulting from the Article XXIV:6 negotiations of 1986/87 include the protection of reasonable expectations the United States had when these concessions were initially negotiated in 1962’.
The fact that the EEC - Oilseeds case (and the unadopted EEC - Canned Fruit case as well) dealt with renegotiation of tariff concessions under Article XXIV:6 as opposed to Article XXVIII or Article XXVIIIbis does not, in our view, undermine the relevance of the above finding to the case at hand. This is because the Article XXIV:6 procedure is simply a means permitting a WTO Member, which has entered into a customs union and which proposes to increase a rate of duty above bound levels, to modify or withdraw that concession under the procedures of Article XXVIII. The panel in EEC - Oilseeds found that there was, effectively, no modification or withdrawal of tariff concessions under Article XXIV:6 -- and no new balance of concessions achieved, i.e., ‘the balance of concessions negotiated in 1962 ... was not altered’ -- even though the tariff bindings on oilseeds had been withdrawn and reinstated intact.
We note that Article XXVIII may be invoked under specifically defined circumstances to modify or withdraw concessions. And, as noted above, Article XXIV:6 permits Members which have entered into customs unions to modify or withdraw those concessions under the procedures of Article XXVIII. Article XXVIIIbis, in contrast, which provides a legal basis for Members to reduce and bind tariffs on a mutually advantageous (i.e. multilateral) basis, as a general rule does not provide a means to modify or withdraw tariff concessions.
We consider, therefore, that reasonable expectations may in principle be said to continue to exist with respect to tariff concessions given by Japan on film and paper in successive rounds of Article XXVIIIbis negotiations. Nevertheless, the establishment of a case based on expectations from rounds concluded 18 or 30 years ago may be difficult. The United States must show that those expectations, as well as its more recent ones, are currently nullified or impaired.”
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