[ 江澤利 ]——(2009-2-4) / 已閱68407次
我國國企MBO制度缺陷與對策研究
江澤利
摘 要
MBO是英文Management Buy-out的縮寫，中文通常被譯作“管理層”收購，是指公司的管理層利用借貸所融資本或股權(quán)交易收購本公司股權(quán)，以改變公司的所有者結(jié)構(gòu)、資產(chǎn)結(jié)構(gòu)和控制權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)，使企業(yè)原經(jīng)營者成為企業(yè)所有者的一種行為。
我國自引進MBO制度以來，對國有企業(yè)，尤其是對我國中小型國有企業(yè)，通過管理層收購實施了國有股產(chǎn)權(quán)改革，取得了較好的成效。但同時也暴露了許多產(chǎn)權(quán)改革過程中的不良現(xiàn)象，如，違規(guī)融資、不公開定價、“自賣自買”等交易，造成國有資產(chǎn)嚴(yán)重流失，引起了社會公眾的普遍關(guān)注，也招致社會各界的議論和不滿。
這些不滿和議論隨著“郎顧之爭”的升溫而被推向了高潮，成為繼1994年“國企改革大討論”之后的又一次“產(chǎn)權(quán)改革大討論”，且迅速席卷全國。
討論的中心議題是MBO是否還應(yīng)該在中國繼續(xù)被實施。 MBO過程中是否真的存在“國有資產(chǎn)流失”現(xiàn)象，政府是否應(yīng)該停止國有企業(yè)MBO，諸如此類的問題也引起了政府的關(guān)注與重視。對此，國資委主任李榮融在2004年10月底的一次新聞發(fā)布會上發(fā)言時承認(rèn)，“當(dāng)前國有資產(chǎn)流失問題集中在MBO，而MBO收購過程中的主要問題就是自賣自買”。2004年12月12日，時任國務(wù)院副總理的黃菊同志，又在出席2004年度中央企業(yè)負(fù)責(zé)人年終總結(jié)大會時指出：“大型企業(yè)不準(zhǔn)搞管理層收購，中小企業(yè)的管理層收購也要區(qū)別情況，要規(guī)范。對于管理層收購，國資委要制定發(fā)布專門文件，做到有章可循。”
政府代表的發(fā)言表明，一，對我國國有企業(yè)MBO的功過是非予以了客觀評價。為回應(yīng)民眾要求制止民脂民膏不被侵吞的強烈呼聲，對發(fā)生在國有企業(yè)MBO過程的非正�，F(xiàn)象予以承認(rèn)。二，國有企業(yè)中還將繼續(xù)實施MBO。我國國有資產(chǎn)改革的大方向不會變，MBO作為國有企業(yè)實現(xiàn)國有股減持的有效措施仍將被繼續(xù)。三，我國國有企業(yè)MBO過程中存在著的這樣或那樣的一些不盡人意問題，是可以通過制度完善，規(guī)范操作來加以避免的。
政府對規(guī)范MBO行為有信心，我也一樣希望對MBO制度缺陷與對策進行研究分析的，探索一套可行的制度，以保證MBO健康進行。本文通過引用西方經(jīng)濟學(xué)理論，如激勵機制、產(chǎn)權(quán)理論、新制度經(jīng)濟學(xué)、產(chǎn)業(yè)經(jīng)濟學(xué)、產(chǎn)業(yè)結(jié)構(gòu)理論、博弈論、制度供給理論及信息經(jīng)濟學(xué)等，對我國國有企業(yè)MBO制度及制度實施現(xiàn)狀進行了全面分析研究，并適度采用了對比法，對中外MBO制度理論進行對比分析。全文共分為三個部分：
第一部分為第1章，是論文基礎(chǔ)部分。在這一部分，作者通過對MBO的起源及基本概念的界定，提出了自己的初步觀點，即，MBO是“管理者收購”，而非“管理層收購”，充實了長期以來指導(dǎo)我國MBO實踐的理論。
第二部分包括第2、3兩章，是論文實證分析部分，也是理論聯(lián)系實際的重要部分。在這一部分，作者從我國國有企業(yè)MBO的歷史出發(fā)，客觀評述了MBO對我國國有企業(yè)產(chǎn)權(quán)改革的重要作用，也揭示了MBO實踐中存在的一些問題；接著，作者又從我國現(xiàn)行有關(guān)MBO制度入手，闡明了我國現(xiàn)行MBO制度的現(xiàn)狀及存在的缺陷和不足，為對策研究提供了充分的事實依據(jù)。
第三部分為第4章，是對策和建議部分。這一部分在前面兩部分基礎(chǔ)之上，從理論創(chuàng)新、制度完善、監(jiān)督控制等幾個方面，對避免和防止MBO實施過程中“國有資產(chǎn)流失”現(xiàn)象，提出了一整套建設(shè)性建議和應(yīng)對措施。對我國國有企業(yè)MBO目標(biāo)及實施措施提出了新的要求，也是對前兩部分研究的綜合與提升，是本文研究的落腳點，充分體現(xiàn)了本文研究的理論和實踐意義。
關(guān)鍵詞: 國有企業(yè) MBO 制度缺陷 對策
Abstract
MBO is an abbreviation of Management Buy-out in English. In Chinese, the abbreviation is usually translated to purchase of "the management "that is refers to the management as one level of the company, for change the owner structure, the property structure and the domination structure of the company, use to lend money to purchases the stock of this company, causes the enterprise original operator to become the enterprise owner's one kind of behavior.
Since our country has been introduced, the MBO system, as an implement of the property reform, to the state-owned enterprise, especially to our middle and small scale state-owned enterprise, which has achieved a good result.
But simultaneously, it also has exposed some undesirable phenomena in process of the property reforms, such as illegal financing, pricing is not open, "traders from buying", and other transactions, resulting in serious loss of state assets, has not only aroused the universal concern of the public but also lead to the community to debate and discontent.
Whit “the dispute of Lang with Gu” was heat up, these dissatisfaction and the discussion is pushed to the high tide, became "the property right to reform the big discussion" which is continues "the state-owned enterprise to reform the big discussion" in 1994, and rapidly sweep all over our country.
In this discussion, it is central that MBO whether also should continue in China. In the MBO process whether the real existence the phenomenon about "the state asset does drain", whether the government should stop state-owned enterprise MBO, the so forth question was repeatedly asked by the public that has aroused government department's interest and takes.
At end of October of 2004, arm at the Public matter of concern proposed which on the discussion process in, Li RongRong as director of State Asset Management Committee, make the speech at a press conference, said, "the question, the current state asset drains, to concentrate in MBO, but the main question, in the MBO process, is from sells buys".
On December 12th, 2004, Huang Ju ,as Vice-Premier of our State, in attends annual's end congress of 2004 year, pointed out, "The major industry does not permit to do MBO, in mid- and small-scale enterprise, the MBO also must distinguish the situation, wants the standard. Regarding the MBO, the State Asset Management Committee must formulate the issue special document, achieves has a legal basis."
In my opinion, the government representative's speech has indicated three meanings. Firstly, it is an evaluation to the operation of our state-owned enterprise by MBO. In order to respond the populace request to stop the action of embezzles which likes flesh and blood of the people, the government acknowledged that it is an unusual phenomenon that above mention phenomena in the MBO of state-owned enterprise process. Secondly, it is an attitude of our government on the question whether continues in the state-owned enterprise to implement MBO. The general orientation of our state asset reform have never been change, MBO, as one effective action to took the state-owned share reduction, will to be continue. Thirdly, these phenomena in our country state-owned enterprise MBO process is may be perfect through set up the standard operates performs and repaid the system to avoid.
Government acts to regulate MBO confidence, as I also hope that the MBO system defects and countermeasures research and analysis, to explore a workable system to ensure that the MBO health. By reference western economic theory, such as the incentive mechanism, and property rights theory, New institution Economics(NIE), industrial economics, and the industrial structure theory, game theory and information theory, and so on, I conducted a comprehensive analysis for China's state-owned enterprises MBO system and the status of implementation of the system, and appropriate use of the comparative method with the foreign MBO system theory. This thesis is divided into three parts:
Part I is chapter 1 is the basis of the thesis. In this section, the author through the MBO and the origin of the definition of basis concepts, raised individual preliminary view that, MBO is one kind of behavior about purchase by manager who is personal rather than by manager who are one collectivity, and enrich the guidance of China's MBO has a theory of practice.
Part II includes chapters 2 and 3, this section is an important part in the paper with empirical Analysis of linking theory with reality. In this section, the author objective review of the MBO as property rights reform of China abut state-owned enterprises from the history of MBO in china, and revealed the existence of the practice of some problems. Author has start study from China's current system of MBO, elaborated China's current MBO system and the status of the existing defects and shortcomings. This part is measures to provide sufficient factual basis for countermeasures study.
Part III be refers to Chapter 4 which is recommendations and responses for above write. Basis of the front part of this thesis, the author put forward a set of constructive proposals and responding to the program, for avoid and prevent the "loss of state assets" phenomenon, a set of constructive proposals and response measures, from the theoretical innovation, and the system improve, supervision and control etc several aspects.
These suggests put forward new requirements for target of reform in China's state-owned enterprises and standard of implementation. This is the end-result of this study and is consolidated and upgrading for parts I and II on this thesis which fully embodies the theoretical and practical significance.
Keyword: State-Owned Enterprises of China/ MBO/ System Shortcoming /Countermeasure
目 錄
論文摘要
第1章 緒 論 1
1．1 選題背景 1
1．1．1 問題的提出 1
1．1．2 研究的現(xiàn)實意義 2
1．2 MBO起源與概念界定 3
1．2．1 MBO的起源 3
1．2．2 MBO的概念 5
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